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Abstract  
 
As yet, there has been no systematic exposition of the whole of Goffman’s work in its 
significance for strategy and strategic management. This paper aims to fill this gap by 
providing a more wide-ranging treatment of Goffman’s central ideas that goes beyond 
some of the more widely circulated core notions, such as frontstage/backstage and 
facework. The paper focuses on ‘performance’ and hypothesizes that skilled 
performance at the interactional level will influence outcomes at organizational level. 
It can be assumed that these performances will influence the broader diffusion of a 
practice at field level. Thus, the paper develops the theoretical idea – an idea implicit 
in Goffman - that for a performance to be performative, in the first instance it has to 
be competent, credible and believable. Under these conditions, it can dominate over 
and drive out less credible interpretations. This can help to understand the progress, or 
lack thereof, of organizational change.  
 
 
Key Words: Goffman; Framing; Performance; Idealization; Presentation of Self; 
Strategy; Strategy-as-Practice.   
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“All social reality is precarious ... All societies are constructions in the face of 
chaos.” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 96) 
 
“’Organisations’ and ‘positions’ are thing-like in their solidity only because they 
are continuously and repeatedly enacted in a series of micro-situations. They are 
solid to the extent that they are taken for granted and thus smoothly re-enacted, 
minute by minute and day after day; but without this process of continual social 
definition, they cease to exist.” (Collins, 1980: 190) 
 
“Soon it was time for him to take to the podium. Those watching him pace in the 
gloom behind the stage, his face contorted and his hands clenched, feared 
disaster. But as the music signaled his entrance into the spotlight, they witnessed 
a transformation. Within seconds, the crumpled wreck metamorphosed into a 
colossus. The actor smoothed over the inevitable imperfections of his speech with 
a wondrously theatrical presentation.” (Bower, 2016: 143) 
 
 
 
Introduction   
 
There is increasing recognition that accounting and strategy are two fields of 
inquiry that should have a more intense debate with each other (Fauré & Rouleau, 
2011; Whittington, 2011; Skærbæk & Tryggestad, 2010; Carter et al, 2010; Whittle & 
Mueller, 2010; Carter & Mueller, 2006). This Special Issue is dedicated to 
strengthening this debate and this paper is making a contribution by discussing Erving 
Goffman and the relevance of his work for strategy and, in particular Strategy-as-
Practice (SAP). In 2007, Whittington (2007: 1577) encouraged us to study “strategy 
…  like any other social practice .. [such as] … marriage.. law, journalism or war.” In 
following up this call, we will be looking into Goffman’s oeuvre.  
In spite of a good number of edited books dealing with different aspects of 
Goffman’s work, primarily in the field of sociology (eg Ditton, 1980a; Smith, 2002, 
2014; Treviño, 2003), as of now, there is no systematic exposition that would 
demonstrate the importance of Goffman’s work for the field of strategy or strategic 
management, notwithstanding the, somewhat perfunctory, treatment Goffman has 
received in existing SAP contributions (eg Rasche & Chia, 2009; Whittington, 2006, 
2007; Samra-Fredericks, 2003, 2004, 2005; Samra-Fredericks et al, 2008). 
Disappointingly, the use of Goffmanian theoretical concepts in management and 
organization studies would appear to be limited to those of ‘face (work)’ (Samra-
Fredericks, 2004: 1115, 2005: 815, 828), ‘frontstage / backstage’ (Samra-Fredericks, 
2004: 1114, 2005: 815, 828; Grey, 1998: 576), total institutions (Clegg, 2006; Clegg 
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et al, 2012) and the social self (Creed et al., 2002). In accounting, again there has been 
some usage of Goffmanian ideas (eg Pentland, 1993; Pentland & Carlile, 1996; 
Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Neu, 1991; Jeacle, 2008, 2012, 2014), but as yet no 
systematic exposition of the whole of Goffman’s work in its significance for 
accounting and strategy. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a more wide-
ranging treatment of Goffman’s work that goes beyond some of the more widely 
circulated core notions.  
Lofland (1980: 25-26) showed that Goffman followed a ‘strategy of 
metaphor’, where a “model is taken as a prototype, various concepts associated with it 
are specified and this apparatus is then applied to all manner of additional situations 
in a relatively systematic fashion.” Examples include the ‘con game’, ‘cooling the 
mark out’, ‘saving face’, ‘persons seen as ritually sacred objects’, ‘the theatre’, the 
‘total institution’, ‘the career’, the ‘service relationship’, the ‘game’ (ibid, p.26). For 
example, after describing the actual process of ‘cooling the mark out’ in a con game1, 
Goffman then proceeds to apply it metaphorically whereby he views “the handling of 
failure as something concertedly to be coped with” (ibid, p.27) in all kinds of 
additional social situations. The frontstage-backstage, theatre metaphor is of course 
the most famous example for this strategy of transferring words and concepts between 
settings.2 
In contrast to many competing sociological theories, including structural-
functionalism, institutional theory, or role theory, Goffman (1971/72: 137) critiques a 
notion that views social control such that the world is divided “into three distinct 
parts: in one the crime is committed, in the second the infraction is brought to trial, 
and in the third […] the punishment is inflicted”. According to Goffman, “(t)he scene 
of the crime, the halls of judgment, and the place of detention are all housed in the 
same cubicle; furthermore, the complete cycle of crime, apprehension, trial, 
punishment, and return to society can run its course in two gestures and a glance.” 
(1971/72: 137) Indeed, “whatever cultural and structural pressures determine our lives 																																								 																					1	The	‘mark’	is	the	victim	of	the	con	game,	‘cooling	out’	means,	after	the	con	has	been	performed,	
talking	to	and	comforting	the	mark	by	bystanders	who	are	secret	associates	of	the	con(wo)man.	2 	It	 is	 worth	 noting,	 that	 Goffman	 did	 not	 treat	 Strategic	 Interaction	 as	 such	 a	 transferable,	
metaphorical	 concept.	He	used	 it	only	 in	one	book	publication	 (Goffman,	1969)	 in	order	 to	analyze	
the	“calculative,	gamelike	aspects”	 (1969:	x)	 in	 interaction	that	 is	characterized	by	a	high	degree	of	
intentionality	and	where	“each	party	must	make	a	move”	(1969:	127).	We	will	not	be	drawing	much	
on	Goffman’s	Strategic	 Interaction	book	as	our	 intention	 in	 this	paper	 is	 to	draw	on	his	work	more	
widely	in	order	to	show	the	multi-faceted	relevance	of	his	most	famous	concepts	for	Strategy.	
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are often experienced only in and through interaction with others …” (Hepworth, 
1980: 97). It is in interaction that we experience norms or structural constraints. 
S-A-P is certainly not oblivious to Goffman’s insights. Indeed, as Whittington, 
one of the founding figures of S-A-P,  argues “Strategy-as-Practice can problematize 
the performance issue at a more micro level as well. In a Goffmanesque sense, S-A-P 
can appreciate the performance of strategy praxis as an achievement in itself. At stake 
here is the competence and credibility of individual practitioners in performing their 
roles, rather than some notion of organizational performance.” (Whittington, 2007: 
1583). For example, if a strategy consultant in her presentation comes over as 
unconvincing, it is unlikely that this performance will make a positive contribution to 
organizational performance outcomes. By implication, this approach shines the 
spotlight onto strategizing, which means how is strategy actually performed? This 
takes us into the realm of looking at what is done by specific people, in specific 
locations, at specific points in time: indeed, ‘how is strategy done in the doings?’ 
Thus, “the focus on the noun strategy has shifted toward an interest in the verb 
strategizing” (Cummings & Daellenbach, 2009: 234). This means that we should take 
an interest in the actual praxis as practiced by practitioners, on the “improvisational 
struggles of everyday life” (Whittington, 2011: 185). Indeed, a Goffman-inspired 
perspective does not deny power or hierarchy, but is providing the “grounds for a 
processual approach to hierarchies as they shape everyday life.” (Rogers, 1980: 28)  
Goffman was primarily concerned with a number of core sociological topics 
(Branaman, 1997: xlvi-xlvii) including the self and performance; encounters; the 
manipulative / moral aspects of social life; framing. Concomitantly, it has been 
widely held that Goffman’s “oeuvre lacks self-evident internal coherence. Each of his 
books is written ... as if none of the others had been.” (Smith, 2006:5) The basis of 
this criticism is that there is no clear sense of books cumulatively building upon each 
other; similarly, there is limited cross-referencing between his books. Indeed, 
“Goffman never re-uses earlier concepts in later works, manifesting a kind of role-
distancing from his own previous work.” (Collins, 1980: 175). Whilst superficially it 
may indeed appear in this way, it would clearly be hard to deny that performing in the 
interaction order is the theme running throughout his work. The remainder of this 
paper is therefore organized around this core topic, as applied to strategy: what can 
we say about strategy-as-performance-in-the-interaction? The following section is 
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about ‘Performing Strategy and the Strategizing of Performance’; this is followed by 
‘Frontstage, Backstage and the Hidden Transcript’; ‘Footing’; ‘Senior Management 
Teams’; ‘Consultants’ Performances’; Strategy (and audit) as machine; The self of the 
Strategist; The Meeting as Performance; ‘Framing the Strategy performance’; 
followed by ‘Discussion and Conclusion’.  
 
Performing Strategy and the Strategizing of Performance 
Whittington (2007: 1579) correctly highlighted the multitude of meanings of 
the notion of ‘performance’: he says, that it “might be approached in the conventional 
terms of a practice’s impact on organizational outcomes (Practice is not indifferent to 
these); or it might be interpreted as about the skilled performance involved in 
managing the ‘practice-in-use’ (Jarzabkowski 2004); or, finally, performance could be 
measured in institutional theory terms, regarding a practice’s own success in 
achieving widespread diffusion and adoption (Dobbin and Baum 2000).” Our focus is 
on the second meaning, but it is understood here that the other two meanings are 
related to the second. Skilled performance at the interactional level will influence 
outcomes at organizational level. Both of these performances will influence the 
broader diffusion of a practice. Nevertheless, for us, the point of departure is the 
performance at the level of an interaction.  
It is of central importance for us, because we see the performance as 
underlying a number of other Goffmanian notions, such as framing, footing, or the 
interaction ritual. We suggest that we interpret these latter notions around 
performance in order to emphasize the praxis dimension in SAP, which means 
actually foregrounding the doing and doings. Such a focus on doings means not to 
treat situations merely “as local ‘color’ with which to fill out the contours of allegedly 
‘larger’, more formal institutions.” (Rawls, 2003: 217) Instead, like Goffman, SAP 
suggests that we analyse the “nitty-gritty, local routines of practice”, “the unheroic 
work of ordinary strategic practitioners in their day-to-day routines.” (Whittington, 
1996: 732, 734) Like Goffman, SAP wants to develop its sociological eye, its 
“appetite to uncover the neglected, the unexpected and the unintended.” (Whittington, 
2007: 1577) 
What then are these techniques underlying our shared social world, i.e. the 
“techniques by which everyday persons sustain their real social situations” and sustain 
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a commonly shared “definition of the situation” (1959/71: 247; also 26)?3 The 
discussion of these techniques in Goffman’s Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(1959/71) is far from straightforward and introduces sophisticated analytical 
instruments, including ‘front region’, ‘back region’, ‘dramatic realization’, 
‘idealizations’, ‘audience segregation’, ‘make-work’, ‘discrepant roles’ amongst 
others. Contrary to popular misunderstandings, the argument is not that the backstage 
is more real than the frontstage, the argument is not that the backstage is the place for 
the sacred, the frontstage the place for the profane (1961/72: 134): often, it “may not 
be necessary to decide which is the more real, the fostered impression or the one the 
performer attempts to prevent the audience from receiving.” (1959/71: 72) The 
ontological question of what is more real recedes into the background and is replaced 
by the sociological question, rooted in pragmatist philosophy, namely ‘under what 
conditions will certain performances appear to us as the actual thing – i.e. not irony, 
not play-acting, not impersonation?’ Indeed, Goffman is concerned with the 
techniques that bring about a shared, believable social world that we have in common. 
In this endeavor he joins Schutz, Thomas, and James. Indeed, he asks “(u)nder what 
circumstances do we think things are real?” (Burns, 1992: 247); “… ‘real’, as James 
suggested, consists of that understanding of what is going on that drives out, that 
“dominates”, all other understandings.” (Goffman, 1974/86: 85) What is often left 
unsaid in Goffman is that for a performance to be performative, in MacKenzie’s 
(2009) sense of the term, in the first instance it has to be competent, credible and 
believable. If it is believable, it can dominate over and drive out less credible 
interpretations.  
Some of Goffman’s work can be interpreted as answering this very question: 
how do people in social situations maintain a shared sense that what they experience 
is the real thing, an event to be taken at face value, i.e. to be taken for what it claims 
to be, and not a prank, an imposter or a rehearsal: “… ‘real’, as James suggested, 
consists of that understanding of what is going on that drives out, that “dominates”, 
all other understandings.” (Goffman, 1974/86: 85) Indeed, “(w)hen an individual 
plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is 
fostered before them. They are asked to believe that the character they see actually 
possesses the attributes he appears to possess, that the task he performs will have the 																																								 																					3	In	Encounters,	he	phrased	it	such	that	“the	local	scene	establishes	what	the	individual	will	mainly	be	
..”	(p.134).	
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consequences that are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in general, matters are what 
they appear to be.” (1959/71: 28)  
This includes, importantly, that a performance claim is credible and not 
delusional or that a strategy presentation is given by competent employees and that 
the diagnosis and the prescribed tools actually work: for example, where a bank’s 
CEO, Chairman and Finance Director put on a performance to ‘sell’ a share rights 
issue, this performance needs to be done with confidence, skill and panache, even, or 
especially, if the actual situation, which will be discussed on the backstage, gives rise 
to worries4. These are reality claims of strategy performances. Competence at the 
interactional level precedes and is one of the conditions for its subsequent 
performativity: where even the presentation is weak, the performative cycle stumbles 
at the first hurdle.  
As we said earlier, the ‘straight’ performances are predicated on them being 
seen as the real thing: not irony, not fake, not a test-run. The Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective has utilized Goffman’s theatre metaphor, in emphasizing the importance 
of the ‘spell’ and ‘bringing off’ a performance: “(t)he practice perspective appreciates 
the quasi-theatrical quality of this performance, in which the proper playing of 
allotted roles ensures smooth progress, but the smallest slip can break the spell and 
bring everything crashing to a halt (De Certeau 1984; Goffman 1959). Bringing off a 
strategy away day or board-meeting is achievement enough, regardless of whether 
connections can ultimately be traced to organizational outcomes. The practice 
perspective finds plenty of significance in the bare performance of praxis.” 
(Whittington, 2006: 628)  
It is obvious in this quote that Strategy-as-Practice draws on Goffman in order 
to emphasize process, situation and actuality, rather than outcome: each situation, 
which is sustained as real is significant irrespective of demonstrating causal links to 
narrowly defined outcomes - the latter being a favorite pre-occupation of much 
mainstream strategy research. However, there are other places where S-A-P seems to 
depart from such a Goffmanian-inspired understanding of practice, such as when 
Whittington (2011: 184) declares that practice theory “resists the seductive ironies of 
unintended consequences or strategic emergence.” This is perhaps a contestable 																																								 																					4	The	case	of	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	would	come	to	mind	here	and	will	be	discussed	later	in	the	
paper.	
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assertion, as the foregrounding of unintended consequences and emergence would 
appear to us as the very point of a sociologically grounded approach to strategy. 
Strategists, through strategy practices and strategy praxis, need to sustain the 
reality of what they do, importantly, the claim that strategy techniques are not snake 
oil but are actually effective. Performativity of strategy practices starts with the 
presentation. Behind the fact that “strategy itself was seeping into every corner of the 
world economy” (Kiechel, 2010: 256) lies the promise that strategy and Strategic 
Management, are effective, can improve an organization’s performance and thus 
competitiveness. A group of strategy consultants presenting to the Management Board 
need to sustain the reality that they are not a bunch of clowns, but a group of 
knowledgeable, trustworthy and effective professionals who act with high standards 
of integrity and competence and that what they have to sell actually works.  
The performance needs to convince companies not to believe the argument 
that “’(s)trategy’, as it is sold by consulting firms, is essentially a pipe dream. Why? 
Because you can sit in a boardroom and plot all you’d like, but once the game has 
started, it’s pretty much improvisation from that point forth.” (McDonald, 2014: 112) 
Once the audience believes that strategy consulting is a pipe dream, the game is up 
and the consulting session is effectively over; the consultants can pack up and go 
home. Indeed, strategy consultants who present to a company board need to foster the 
impression that it is here where the company strategy is actually being designed from 
– even if the reality comes closer to Mintzberg’s notion of an emergent and 
organizationally dispersed strategy process. Again, if strategy consultants want to 
credibly furnish the “corner office with analytic tools to justify any decisions about 
those businesses…” (Kiechel, 2010: 259) affected by these decisions, then these tools 
need to be seen as convincing. 
 
Frontstage, Backstage and the Hidden Transcript 
Emergent and unintended consequences partly come about, partially 
unnoticed, because certain acts of resistance, of game-playing, of diversions first have 
a life on the backstage before they get performed on the frontstage: for example, if 
workers on a construction site (Clegg, 1975) have agreed in their ‘hidden transcript’ 
(Scott, 1990) to perform an unofficial ‘go-slow’, on the public transcript a credible 
performance might need to be delivered that they are working-as-normal. In the latter 
	 9	
case, the impression fostered is as important as the actual ‘work’ accomplished - or 
not accomplished in this scenario. Open resistance might come as a surprise only if 
the hidden transcript went unnoticed.  
S-A-P could study either frontstage or backstage or, ideally, both: they are 
different realities, neither of which should be declared as more real or as less real. 
Both frontstage and backstage performances can best be studied in way of as-it-
happens, via ethnographic, non-participant observation for example, rather than via 
retrospective interviews. Indeed, S-A-P is willing to study how “people ‘make do’ in 
everyday life, negotiating the constraints handed down to them through a constant 
stream of tricks, stratagems and manoeuvres.” (Whittington, 2006: 615; de Certeau, 
1984). In the case of ‘pure’ performances, no audience means no performance - such 
as in orchestra, scripted drama, ballet performances or strategy talk. In the case of 
‘impure’ performances, managers will simply go about their daily work, or workers 
work on a construction site or actors engaging in a rehearsal; here, performers are to 
some degree unconcerned about their audience (Goffman, 1974/86: 125-6; Smith, 
2006: 61; Clegg, 1975).  
Thus, it seems plausible to argue that both the ‘powerful’ in society and the 
‘powerless’ equally have incentives, or good reasons, to treat frontstage and backstage 
differently. Few have expressed this relationship with greater insight or intelligence 
than James C Scott (1990) in his ‘Domination and the Arts of Resistance’: “The 
offstage transcript of elites is, like its counterpart among subordinates, derivative: it 
consists in those gestures and words that inflect, contradict, or confirm what appears 
in the public transcript.” (Scott, 1990: 10) Thus, both hidden and public transcripts 
should be treated as relevant in their own right. In order to study them, but especially 
to properly study the more evasive hidden transcript, in-depth ethnographic methods 
need to be employed: “ .. it is remarkable what can come from straight and simple 
observation, with no agenda other than letting reality hit you in the face.” (Mintzberg, 
2009: 7) This is especially consequential for strategy research where too often, the 
public transcript is treated as the only relevant reality.  
If, say, the project team discussing strategy in a meeting is the public 
transcript, what people actually think, their hidden transcript, can be discerned, for 
example, by (inadvertently) listening into their conversation during a coffee break 
(Whittle, Mueller & Mangan, 2009). Comparing frontstage and backstage can be 
highly enlightening in order to understand the progress, or lack thereof, of 
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organizational change. Indeed, ‘audience segregation’ (Goffman, 1967: 108), when 
people say different things to different audiences, needs to be studied more 
systematically as part of wanting to understand organizational change.5 In any case, 
even when it comes to “’personal’ matters and ‘personal’ relationships – with what an 
individual is ‘really’ like underneath it all when he relaxes and breaks through to 
those in his presence” (Goffman, 1961/1972: 134), it is still open to sociological 
analysis. The pointless attempt to define the personal as truly authentic and thus 
‘sacred’ and keep it free from the eye of the sociologist, is for Goffman both ‘vulgar’ 
and ‘touching’ (ibid.).  
 
Footing 
In order to study aspects of performance, the concept of ‘footing’ (Goffman, 
1981b; Mueller & Whittle, 2011; Sorsa et al, 2014) can be helpful: footing refers to 
the technique, not necessarily conscious, where a speaker only animates what she 
says, thus essentially speaks on behalf of someone else, who as author wrote the 
words, and/or as principal represents the position or values on whose behalf the 
animator speaks. ‘In our last board meeting, the CEO has made it clear that he wants 
this change. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news’ would be an example where a change 
agent employs footing as part of a strategic change effort (Whittle & Mueller, 2008). 
Footing is a way for the speaker to position herself in a meeting, in a certain way, a 
positioning which is relevant for the course of the interaction. Where the author 
and/or principal are endowed with sufficient authority, the animator might be more 
likely to succeed in bringing about change.  
There can be interesting combinations and variations and an instructive 
example is worth giving from the first Blair government: Alistair Campbell, Blair’s 
Director of Communications, (author) would write articles and speeches, that would 
be printed in the name of or delivered by Tony Blair (animator) and they purely 
generated interest insofar as they spoke on behalf of, expressing the values and 
policies of, the principal, Tony Blair (Rawnsley, 2001: 377). On the rare occasions 
that a statement was written by Tony Blair himself, experts like the Sun’s editor, 
David Yelland, “could tell it was Blair’s own work, rather than the hand of Campbell, 
because ‘it isn’t as well-written as usual’.” (Rawnsley, 2001: 378) It would appear 																																								 																					5	There	are	complications	in	that	each	backstage,	analytically	speaking,	has	its	own	frontstage	and	
another	backstage	–	ad	infinitum.	
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that the author Campbell was better in expressing the views of the principal, Blair, 
than the author Blair.  
Footing is important for analyzing certain strategic organizational change 
scenarios. Often, agents on the ground will invoke others as relevant for motivating 
the change effort: either in their capacity as authors, i.e. people who have written the 
words. Or in their role as principals, i.e. people who want this change to happen.  
 
Senior Management teams 
CEOs know, just like senior strategy consultants know, “that a single note off 
key can disrupt the tone of an entire performance.” (Goffman, 1959/71: 60) Indeed, 
“(w)e must be prepared to see that the impression of reality fostered by a performance 
is a delicate, fragile thing that can be shattered by very minor mishaps.” (Goffman, 
1959/71: 63) One such off note can mean that the audience, financial analysts and 
investment advisers say, conclude that the performer is not really the ‘proper’ CEO, 
but a temporary stand-in, someone who covers so that the ‘real’ CEO can be 
appointed. When the former Lehman Brothers CEO, Dick Fuld, in his early days as 
CEO, gave a “terrible presentation”, he was advised by a senior McKinsey consultant 
that “he’d better hire a speech coach.” (McDonald, 2014: 230) After doubts had 
surfaced about RBS’ capital position, the four most senior RBS executives (CEO, 
Chairman, Finance director, Director of the Global Banking & Markets division) were 
facing a group of investment analysts in April 2008, in the run-up to their planned 
rights issue. It was consequential that their “performances were even less convincing 
than those of 28 February.” (Fraser, 2014: 6371 [kindle])  
Where presentations by senior executives, who are expected to be very 
competent as far as presenting is concerned, show any form of weakness, an audience 
is tempted to interpret this as a strong indication that ‘things are not quite right’. Steve 
Jobs knew this only too well: “Jobs himself rehearsed the presentations dozen of 
times so that each relaxed statement would come off just right.” (Lashinsky, 2012: 
124) Again, Goffman (1974/86: 132-3) recognized that even relaxed spontaneity can 
be the result of planning and rehearsal: “the informal chatter a popular singer may 
offer between songs is likely to be scripted, yet is clearly received as outside the song 
frame, thus unofficial, informal, directly communicated.” And: “To give a radio talk 
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that will sound genuinely informal, spontaneous, and relaxed, the speaker may have to 
design his script with painstaking care, testing one phrase after another, in order to 
follow the content, language, rhythm, and pace of everyday talk.” (1959/71: 42) 
Rawnsley (2001: 180) provides an instructive example from the first Blair 
government where during a Foreign Office crisis involving Sierra Leone, “Blair 
delivered an apparently extempore, but actually carefully rehearsed, interpretation of 
what had happened.” This can easily be imagined during the talk of a strategy 
consultant. The relaxed, seemingly spontaneous aspect of the delivery enhances our 
respect for the competence of the performer: in this sense, we are actually being 
misled. But this form of small-scale dishonesty is part of the structure of our everyday 
world: these deceptions ensure that ‘performances’ are more effective than they 
would otherwise be.  
On the other hand, where a CEO is too spontaneous and ‘loses it’, skilled 
observers will interpret the incompetent performance and may want to read behind the 
curtain: after Enron CEO Jeff Skilling had, live on air, called a hedge fund manager 
an “asshole”, another hedge fund manager “was in hysterics ..[and] was more 
convinced than ever that Enron was hiding serious problems.” (McLean & Elkind, 
2013: 326) Here, too much and inappropriate spontaneity in a way gave the ‘game 
away’. Spontaneity, just like authenticity, needs to be performed competently and 
skillfully. Indeed, the inability to perform as expected will make the audience draw 
certain conclusions about what is happening behind the scenes. A ‘maliciously 
offensive act’ (Goffman, 1963: 218) will make witnesses interpret the offender to be 
“alienated from the gathering and its rulings” (ibid p.219) – an unusual scenario in the 
case of a CEO and an investment analysts conference call6. Thus, spontaneity and 
authenticity need to be performed competently and appropriate to the social situation, 
otherwise it may well become counter-productive.  
 
Consultants’ Performances  
As Whittington (2007: 1579) rightly pointed out, “in more than twenty six 
years, the Strategic Management Journal has attended amply to top management 
teams, and increasingly to middle managers, but published not a single article on 																																								 																					6	In	the	Skilling	case,	the	recipient	of	the	abuse	was	a	short	seller	of	Enron	stock.		
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strategy consultants.” In contrast, one of the central insights and arguments of S-A-P 
is the point that consulting firms are both producers and consumers of strategy 
discourse (Whittington et al, 2003: 399) and therefore deserving of our attention.  
Goffman (1959/71) discussed the specific methods and  processes, which are 
employed in order to create an overall sense that something is real, credible, serious, 
competent, rather than say a test-run or a prank. This argument was taken up by SAP: 
“(a)t the personal level, there is a dramaturgical sense of performance, as in 
Goffman’s (1959) presentation of self in everyday life and the carrying off of praxis. 
What does it take for consultants, planners or managers simply to perform their parts 
as credible strategists?” (Whittington, 2007: 1580) In Goffman’s (1959/71: 36) words, 
“many service occupations offer their clients a performance that is illuminated with 
dramatic expressions of cleanliness, modernity, competence, and integrity.” Indeed, 
“the individual constantly acts to provide information that he is of sound character 
and reasonable competency.” (1971/72: 198) Performing competence is not a form of 
deception, it is simply a different form of creating, or producing, reality – different in 
method, but not in principle from a medical doctor, who reassures patients of her 
competence by displaying her medical school diplomas on the wall in her practice. 
Both competency and sound character have to be performed – they cannot be 
conveyed via direct communication, as saying ‘trust me, I am competent’ or ‘trust me, 
I am honest’ is likely to be counter-productive.  
All organizational leaders, on a continuous basis, need to perform 
idealizations, i.e. performing officially accredited values; indeed, this applies to 
political leaders7, leaders of professional services firms (PSFs), and corporate leaders 
equally. Specific techniques can be employed in order to sustain these idealizations 
and consultants have played an important role in this process: “(t)here is little doubt 
that McKinsey has made the corporate world more efficient, more rational, more 
objective, and more fact based.” (McDonald, 2014: 8) What McDonald confidently 
asserts as a fact is in fact highly contested. What we can say is that PSFs have played 
a central part in propagating the idealizations of rationality, objectivity, factuality and 
efficiency. It is a core part of PSFs’ projected external identity to suggest that they are 
upholding societal / professional values. Naturally, the methods, tools and practices 																																								 																					7	A	nice	illustration	in	Laws	(2016:	199):	“Nick	Clegg	spelled	out	that	while,	as	a	liberal,	he	was	of	course	determined	to	defend	press	freedoms,	his	basic	view	was	that	Lord	Justice	Leveson’s	recommendations	should	be	implemented	unless	they	were	quite	clearly	disproportionate.”	
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involved in performing and projecting a desired reality will be different between 
professions. Whilst accountants draw on a shared audit knowledge base to make their 
reality more objective and idealized (Pentland, 1993), strategy consultants use 
diagrams, 2x2 matrices and quantification to achieve the same aim (Carter & Mueller, 
2006): "(w)hen an individual presents himself to others, his performance will tend to 
incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the society, more so in 
fact, than does his behavior as a whole." (1959/71:45)  
Equipped with these sermons, or discursively constructed idealizations, 
strategists, with their considerable positive symbolic capital are in a position where 
they can give an ‘official imprint’, i.e. give advice at the highest level, speak 
confidently, adjudicate authoritatively and thus have substantial influence on 
organizational change (Mueller & Carter, 2005a,b; Fincham, 2012: 421). Strategists 
can confidently demand that certain techniques are used in order to study 
competitiveness and, failure to do so, would be an indication of a lack of objectivity. 
Undoubtedly, the declining influence of many professions mentioned by Goffman has 
had its mirror image in the rising influence of both the strategist at the apex of 
organizations as well as strategy consultants (Kiechel, 2010). Strategists are under 
strong expectations that they perform, again and again, at the highest level of 
presentational ability; indeed, a “certain bureaucratization of the spirit is expected so 
that we can be relied upon to give a perfectly homogenous performance at every 
appointed time.” (Goffman, 1959/71: 64)8 Guru speakers seem to achieve such 
homogenous, routinized high-level performances. In ‘guru talk’, audience laughter 
and applause “contribute to a sense of cohesion and intimacy, which might make 
audiences more receptive to the gurus’ recommendations.” (Greatbatch & Clark, 
2003: 1538) Again, certain techniques included as part of the presentation ensure that 
the message appears more convincing in the eyes of the audience.  
McKinsey is the world’s most pre-eminent strategy consultancy company: 
how was it made into this? Its third and long-time Managing Director, Marvin Bower, 
who ran the firm from 1950 to 1967, advocated inventing the ‘McKinsey persona’, a 
confident, discreet consultant, who always prioritized the firm over personal glory 
(McDonald, 2014: 42). For example, in order to be credible as strategists, protagonists 																																								 																					8	Goffman	does	not	reference	Max	Weber	here	but	Weber’s	(1904/1992)	similar	formulation	of	
viewing	rational-legal	bureaucracy	as	the	rational	spirit’s	organizational	manifestation	is	worth	
mentioning	here. 	
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may need to speak with substantial confidence, use Powerpoint as a tool, and use a 
2x2 matrix as a method of communication (Kaplan, 2011). ‘Carrying it off’ may 
require certain quite superficial methods to be employed, methods that sustain 
impressions of a credible strategist communicating here (Clark, 1995): “(i)f you were 
an airline passenger, and the pilot came aboard the plane and he wore shorts and a 
flaming scarf, would you have the same confidence as you did when he came on with 
his four stripes on the shoulder? Basically, the dress code all has to do with what you 
want to do, when you want to build confidence and an identity.” (Marvin Bower, cited 
in: McDonald, 2014: 48) Indeed, the airline pilot metaphor resonates closely with 
Whittington’s (1993: 25) point that strategy consultancy can equip managers with 
“comforting rituals, managerial security blankets in a hostile world.”  
Similarly, for the CEO or the strategy consultant to hold an MBA from a top 
business school, can provide the perception of such a ‘security blanket’ (Pfeffer & 
Fong, 2002; Gioia & Corley, 2002): indeed, it can function as a credential, thus 
indirectly communicating certain messages to prospective and actual clients: 
“(c)oincident with the rise of strategy and a driving force behind it, an ever-greater 
share of MBAs from elite institutions has been hired by consulting outfits.” (Kiechel, 
2010: 275) For McKinsey in the 1950s and 1960s, the surest way to elite status was 
“to act as if you already were elite.” (McDonald, 2014: 94) The MBA was the 
equivalent for the strategy ‘profession’, what the CA credential was for the 
accounting profession; indeed, McKinsey wanted to be considered a proper profession 
by the top companies (ibid 128-9). Because consulting is a service that is consumed at 
the same time as it is produced, “(i)n the end, impressions can be all that matter.” 
(ibid 168)  
The latter can of course mean different things for different companies and 
different contexts. For example, given that trust includes competence and integrity, 
neither of which are easy to display, how can a consulting firm convince its clients 
that it can indeed be trusted (Clark, 1995)? “ … (U)nlike other professions- law, 
medicine- consulting was obviously built on pretense, where dress, manners, and 
language were meant to present some notion of capability that wasn’t there to see on a 
diploma.” (McDonald, 2014: 51) Consultants, as we know, at some point added the 
‘diploma’ to the list, in that an MBA from a top U.S. or European business school 
would be a required qualification for a strategy consultant, just like a CA qualification 
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is for an accountant.9 But in addition to possessing an MBA, an MBA also needs to be 
performed, needs to be displayed via confidence, competence, and ability to talk well. 
All professions need to be performed, and idealizations, namely performing 
“officially accredited values of the society” (Goffman, 1959/71: 35), are integral to 
these performances. 
Presumably, without having read Goffman, top strategy consultancies still 
seemed to know that an audience can “pounce on trifling flaws as a sign that the 
whole show is false …” (Goffman, 1959/71: 59). When strategy consultants teams 
work with client teams on implementation aspects of the strategic advice provided, a 
crucial test is still ‘Who will make the final presentation?’ – indeed, “when push 
comes to shove, the McKinsey director will be at the board doing a presentation” 
unlike some of their competitors (Kiechel, 2010: 182). Top strategy consultancies 
seem to understand that strategy as an elite product is partly, or largely, about getting 
the presentation and language of strategy absolutely right (Carter et al, 2008: 83; 
Carter & Mueller, 2002): indeed, “strategies .. on the whole .. came from business 
elites and top management teams trained in the most elite business schools.” (Clegg et 
al., 2011: 35) The elite character of the strategists shows through in their typically 
superb presentations.  
Thus, strategy consultants would know that the professional “etiquette is a 
body of ritual which grows up informally to preserve, before the clients, the common 
front of the profession.” (E Hughes, cited in Goffman, 1959/71: 95) And strategy 
consultancies would probably also acknowledge that “those who work backstage will 
achieve technical standards while those who work in the front region will achieve 
expressive ones.” (Goffman, 1959/71: 126) A different way of putting this is to say 
that top talent works on a number of projects, applying their knowledge, “while fresh-
faced Harvard graduates carry on the legwork.” (McDonald, 2014: 88) The 
perpetuation of a professional culture requires that both non-visible aspects, such as 
knowledge, and visible aspects, such as speech, dress code and manners, are part of 
routinized, recursive practices. A similar point was made for Goldman Sachs’ culture: 
“Partners were always looking to see whether an intern had the makings of a ‘culture 
																																								 																					9	Why	do	accountants	not	resent	the	image	of	being	dull	and	grey?	Jeacle	(2008:	1298)	reminds	us	that	
“(p)rofessional	credibility	is	inherent	in	the	accounting	stereotype.	The	beancounter	may	be	dull	and	dreary	but	
she/he	is	also	regarded	as	a	safe	and	trustworthy	custodian	of	business	assets.”	
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carrier’, Goldman-speak for someone who is able to deal with clients and colleagues 
in a way that preserves the firm’s reputation … ” (Smith, 2012: Ch.1). Indeed, 
“managers have to be able to (b)ring off their actions as being in accord with the 
strategic objectives of the organization that employs them.” (Clegg et al., 2011: 28) 
Strategy cannot exist only in the strategic plan, it has to be enacted and any enactment 
is a performance for a specific audience carried out in specific situations.  
For a range of professions, including doctors, lawyers, accountants, auditors 
we might use relatively superficial, but visible, characteristics as fairly reliable 
indicators that an ethical and competent professional is at work here (Goffman, 
1959/71: 36). In some occupations, “prizefighters, surgeons, violinists, and policemen 
are cases in point” (Goffman, 1959/71: 41), an especially dramatic performance might 
help in “vividly conveying the qualities and attributes claimed …” (bid). How indeed 
can service occupations display, i.e. make “visible”, to audiences the substantial 
“invisible costs” (Goffman, 1959/71: 42) that they have incurred in the past, often in 
the background, and which need to be incurred in order to provide the service that is 
visible in the foreground? Those organizations, such as Goldman Sachs or McKinsey, 
for which corporate culture can be a decisive strategic asset (Mueller, 1996), are keen 
to display a certain front, which allows the audience to draw positive conclusions 
about the backstage which is not visible to the audience, say its values, principles, 
educational competencies and higher purposes. Critical realists tell us “of something 
called ‘legitimacy’, and of ‘values’, floating somewhere in a conceptual sky beyond 
the heads of real people in ordinary situations.” (Collins, 2004: 103) What we instead 
want to know is how these abstractions are enacted in concrete, “live” situations. 
 
Organizations as “effective machines”  
Goffman (1961/1991: 73) has described organizations as “effective machines 
for producing a few officially avowed and socially approved ends.” Pentland (1993: 
620) has provided this brilliant description of the work of auditors: “To society at 
large, the sanctity of the audit ritual is largely taken for granted, presupposed as a 
shared cultural resource. And therein lies the myth: as long as the audit machines are 
working, we can all be comfortable with the numbers.” We can replace ‘audit’ with 
‘strategy’, and it is just as insightful. Auditors, investment banks, strategy 
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consultancies: as long as the rituals and performances on the front stage are 
convincing, we trust the machines operating in the background and we trust the 
numbers that are produced in the process. Other performances on the frontage include 
philanthropic activities by investment banks: in the case of Goldman philanthropy, 
these are the Goldman Sachs Foundation, endowed with USD200m and the Goldman 
Sachs Relief Fund and Outreach, created in response to September 11, 2001 (Mandis, 
2013: 234). Such activities create a “sense of higher purpose” (p.238) pursued by the 
firm, and can create a sense that a premium culture operates in the background, that 
this firm is like a charity or other value based organisation, about much more than 
money.  
Often, there are more or less blatant contradictions “between what the 
institution does and what its officials must say it does, [and this] forms the basic 
context of the staff’s daily activity.” (Goffman, 1961/1991: 73) This distinction 
between official ends and actual practice, the ‘underlife’ of the organization, 
influenced Mintzberg’s (1987) seminal argument about the 5Ps of Strategy, especially 
the notion of strategy-as-pattern: “(s)treams of behavior could be isolated and 
strategies identified as patterns or consistencies in such streams.” (Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985: 257) From this, Mintzberg developed the highly influential concept of 
an emergent strategy which needs to be seen as often more important than the 
officially avowed (i.e. deliberate) strategy. All kinds of unofficial, but sociologically 
highly important, activities shape this process of emergence.   
In contrast to the predominant theories of the 1950s, including Parsonian 
structural-functionalism, and the conflict theories of Dahrendorf and Coser, Goffman 
studied the underlife of organization, the perennially fragile nature of micro order. 
Clegg (2006) and Jenkins (2008) draw primarily on Asylums in order to make their, 
somewhat implausible, case that one can use Goffman in order to understand power. 
Yes, perhaps in the same way that one can use a sieve in order to catch water.10 We 
agree with Giddens (1988) that Goffman was not overly keen to “analyse the 
interaction of the powerful – at least, in circumstances in which that power is being 
exercised.” (ibid 274) It was only in a footnote that Goffman (1971/72: 337FN) asked 																																								 																					10	Goffman	(1961/91:	16-17)	includes	a	number	of	organizations	in	his	typology	of	total	institutions	
where	‘inmates’	are	not	typically	(even	though	sometimes	they	might	be)	held	against	their	will,	
including	ships,	boarding	schools,	abbeys,	monasteries,	convents,	cloisters,	servants	(in	servants	
quarters).	Clegg	(2006) and Clegg	et	al	(2008)	ignore	this	in	order	to	sustain	their	implausible	
interpretation	of	total	institutions.		
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the question “How come persons in authority have been so overwhelmingly 
successful in conning those beneath them into keeping the hell out of their offices?”11 
In another rare instance, Goffman referred to the “social arrangements enjoyed by 
those with institutional authority - priests, psychiatrists, school teachers, police, 
generals, government leaders, parents, males, whites, nationals, media operators and 
all the other well-placed persons who are in a position to give official imprint to 
versions of reality.” (Goffman, 1967: 17) But these are isolated instances and there is 
no systematic development of a theory of power or authority.  
Goffman makes no significant contribution to the theorization of power – but 
that should not be held against him. He has, however, greatly enriched our 
understanding of how organizations, audit and strategy function as performing 
machines and the role of ceremonies (and so on) in upholding such functionality.  
 
The Self of the Strategist 
Goffman (1959/71: 57) approvingly cites William James’ dictum that “he has 
as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose 
opinion he cares.” Goffman (1959/71: 244-5) defines the social self as the ‘character’ 
who “is a product of a scene that comes off … The self, then, as a performed 
character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location, whose fundamental fate 
is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a 
scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is whether it 
will be credited or discredited.” The theatre metaphor in these sentences is indicated 
by ‘dramatic’, ‘scene’, ‘presented’. As far as self-as-character is concerned, “each 
self, occurs within the confines of an institutional system, whether a social 
establishment such as a mental hospital or a complex of personal and professional 
relationships […] The self in this sense is not a property of the person to whom it is 
attributed, but dwells rather in the pattern of social control that is exerted in 
connection with the person by himself and those around him.” (Goffman, 1961/91: 
168) Indeed, “his social face … is only on loan to him from society …” (Goffman, 
1967: 10). In these sentences, Goffman basically puts forward a social construction 
perspective on the self, building on writers such as William James, Charles Horton 
																																								 																					11	Gamson	(1985:	605-6)	provides	an	illuminating	discussion	of	this.		
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Cooley12 and George H Mead. For them, the self is essentially a social product, 
residing in “the special mutuality of immediate social interaction.”  (Goffman, 1963: 
16) 
Secondly, the individual can be viewed as a psychobiological entity, with a 
capacity to learn, with fantasies and dreams, anxiety and dread, i.e. with 
psychobiological characteristics and with features of physical continuity. Whilst the 
social character is a fleeting self, the psychobiological self is a continuous self: the 
latter comes close to our common sense, everyday understanding of our self, where 
we hold each other accountable for inconsistencies (“That’s different from what you 
said a few days ago …”), and dramatic changes (“you have changed a lot since I last 
saw you”). A continuous, fairly stable self is central to our everyday concept of the 
self and often leads to suspicions vis-à-vis those ‘performers’, who are seen as talking 
or behaving very differently in different social settings. In his 1971 book, Relations in 
Public, Goffman restated it by distinguishing between ‘personal identity’ and ‘social 
identity’, whereby the latter stands for “the broad social categories […] to which an 
individual can belong and be seen as belonging: age-grade, sex, class, regiment, and 
so forth. By ‘personal identity’ I mean the unique organic continuity imputed to each 
individual …” (1971/72: 227).  
In Asylums, Goffman (1961/1991: 117-156) coined the term ‘moral career’, 
one attraction of which was that it allowed the researcher “to move back and forth 
between the personal and the public” (119). Upon entry into the asylum, the patient 
typically experiences “abandonment, disloyalty, and embitterment” (125) vis-à-vis 
family and friends on the ‘outside’, which we could also call the career of the self: 
“Given the stage that any person has reached in a career, one typically finds that he 
constructs an image of his life course – past, present, and future – which selects, 
abstracts, and distorts in such a way as to provide him with a view of himself that he 
can usefully expound in current situations.” (Goffman, 1961/1991: 139)  
In summary, what we can take from Goffman is that the self of the strategist is 
a social creation and social construction that provides certain managers, and strategy 
consultants, with an identity that they would not have had at different times or in 
different contexts. For strategists to be able to “construct their subjectivities through 
the exciting discourse of strategy …” (Clegg et al, 2004: 26), constitutes them as 																																								 																					12	See	Smith	(2006:	413)	for	how	Goffman	draws	on	Cooley.		
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strategists, both internally and externally: with regard to the latter, it provided status 
and prestige, especially in the context of globalisation, neoliberalism and 
managerialism from the late 1980s onwards. It equips the strategist with a distinct 
‘persona’ that includes a distinct vocabulary, a performed competence, social prestige 
and the discursive right to adjudicate on matters of competition and competitiveness.  
 
 
The Meeting as Performance  
 
At the theoretical level, the role of various types of face-to-face encounters is 
readily acknowledged: Whittington (2006: 619) argued that strategy praxis takes 
place in episodes such as management retreats, consulting interventions, 
presentations, team briefings, projects, simple talk and board meetings. Thus, 
somewhat paradoxically, even though meetings are the main locations where 
strategies are proposed, debated, modified, contested, agreed upon, and argued over, 
they have not attracted corresponding empirical work from strategy researchers 
(Kwon, Clarke & Wodak, 2014 is an exception). This is regrettable and needs 
rectifying.  
Goffman devoted a whole book plus sections in his other books to the analysis 
of encounters. An encounter or a focused gathering involves “a single visual and 
cognitive focus of attention; a mutual and preferential openness to verbal 
communication; a heightened mutual relevance of acts; an eye-to-eye ecological 
huddle that maximizes each participant’s opportunity to perceive the other 
participants’ monitoring of him” (Goffman, 1961/1972: 17-18). “Some social 
occasions, a funeral, [or a meeting, the Author] for example, have a fairly sharp 
beginning and end, and fairly strict limits on attendance and tolerated activities.” 
(1963: 18-19) Beginning and end are “usually marked by some ceremony or ritual 
expression” (Gamson, 1985: 607-8), what we might call ‘temporal brackets’. Also 
worth noting is that “(t)he encounter is a field of interpersonal tension, discrepancy 
and disruption.” (Lofland, 1980: 36) One can mention a whole range of examples of 
encounters – a long chapter is devoted to “fun in games” (Goffman’s (1961/1972: 15-
72) for example - but one encounter that is of special interest to the strategy and 
management literature is the project or management team meeting. The meeting is 
also of special interests to ethnographers and anthropologists who have treated it as a 
distinct social setting (Schwartzman, 1989) with special significance. It is typically 
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bracketed by ritualistic openings and closings. At RBS, under Fred Goodwin’s 
leadership, for example, regular morning meetings would “become a wearing litany of 
problems, game-playing and blame-dodging.” (Martin, 2014: 177) Of course, each 
meeting being a frontstage would then have a backstage, where each game played, 
each blame-allocation accomplished, would have a corresponding backstage 
interaction where victims might converse in confidence about their separate, or joint, 
suffering.  
What is clear is that a substantial amount of strategy work or strategizing gets 
accomplished in meetings. In light of the substantial effort expended “by Goffman to 
study face-to-face interaction as a naturally bounded analytically coherent field” 
(Psathas, 1980: 69), we argue that Goffman-inspired SAP research would clearly 
prioritize the study of real-time interaction in meetings in a naturalistic fashion. In her 
detailed ethnographic work in organizational meetings, Samra-Fredericks (2003, 
2004, 2005) and, more recently Whittle et al. (2015; Whittle et al. 2014; Mueller et al, 
2013) and Kwon et al (2014) have established that a substantial amount of actual 
strategizing work happens in organizational meetings. Where the strategy research 
agenda could be pushed further is by also studying instances of related backstage 
interaction.13  
Goffman’s work has been influential in shaping debates in the mobilization 
and social movements literature. Here is not the place to review this literature beyond 
some cursory suggestions how Goffman’s work can inform insights for ideas on 
mobilization of (strategic) change (or resistance) in organisations. Gamson (1985) 
showed how micromobilisation is dependent on Goffmanian concerns such as face-to-
face encounters: “Micromobilization […] is the study of how face-to-face encounters 
affect long term efforts to bring about social change through the mobilization of 
resources for collective action.” (Gamson, 1985: 607) There are a number of 
important points being made here: firstly, micro action can cumulatively lead to, or 
bring about, meso action or change, which can have macro effects, for example, in 
terms of political regime change, or more importantly for our purposes, strategic 
organizational change. By implication, and methodologically speaking, we should 																																								 																					13	Samra-Fredericks	has,	 following	on	from	Anne	Rawls	 (1989:152),	criticized	Goffman	for	not	using	
“detailed	data	necessary	to	see	the	constitutive	components	of	conversational	and	social	settings	and	
the	 sequential	 regularities	 of	 talk”	 (Samra-Frederiks,	 2010:	 2147).	 Goffman’s	 methodology	 is	 a	
running	sore	that	has	invited	countless	instances	of	critique	(eg	Collins,	1980:	173)	and	it	was	behind	
the	(in)famous	split	between	Goffman	and	Sacks	in	the	1960s.	
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study in some detail micro-level interactions, if we want to have a good understanding 
of meso-level change.  
What are the implications for strategic organisational change? The 
implications are three-fold: strategic organisational change can only come about if 
there are concrete actions in specific situations that aim to bring about change; macro 
change is what appears in acts of retrospective sensemaking to the observer, but for 
the contemporaneous agent, their sensemaking is shaped by the concerns of the 
concrete encounter that is taking place here-and-now. A number of sociologists have 
shown the futility wanting to explain concrete instances of behaviour with reference 
to abstract, long-term goals. Rather than simply diagnosing structural shifts at the 
macro level, one can study the specific encounters at the micro level that cumulatively 
build these shifts, gradually and incrementally (Ranson et al, 1980). We will take up 
this point in the conclusions. 
 
Performing Framing – Framing the Performance 
 
Goffman’s notion of frame has been highly influential across a whole range of 
disciplines14, including sociology, linguistics, anthropology, social movement theory 
(Snow et al., 1986; Zald, 1996; Benford, 1997; Benford & Snow, 2000), media 
studies (Tuchman, 1978; D’Angelo, 2002; Johnson-Cartee, 2004), management 
(Ranson et al., 1980: 5; Neale & Bazerman, 1985; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), negotiation 
(Dewulf et al, 2009) and (discursive) leadership (Fairhurst & Saar, 1996; Fairhurst, 
2010). In the context of the strategic organizational change literature, reference to 
Goffman’s framing concept has been made “as a way of fostering understanding and 
creating legitimacy for a change.” (Cornelissen, Holt & Zundel, 2011: 2) Kaplan’s (2008: 
730) paper aims to “illuminate the dynamics of strategy making within an organization to 
reveal the micromechanisms by which frames and politics interrelate.” Dewulf et al 
(2009: 158) draw on Goffman (1974, 1981) in order to develop their perspective of 
‘interactional framing’. In his influential ‘Talking politics’, Gamson (1992) explains: 
“like a picture frame, a frame directs our attention to what is relevant; like a window 
frame, it determines our perspectives while limiting our view of the world; like the frame 
of a house, it is an invisible infrastructure that holds together different rooms and gives 
shape to the edifices of meaning.” (as summarized in Creed et al., 2002: 481)  																																								 																					14	For	the	purposes	of	writing	this	section,	we	were	conscious	of	a	recent	effort	in	summarizing	the	
debate	in	Management	and	Organization	Studies	(Cornelissen	&	Werner,	2014).	
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In his 1974 Frame Analysis, Goffman marks the break with his previous work 
with the, for him momentous, statement “The first issue is not interaction but frame.” 
(Goffman, 1974/1986: 127) He points to “the basic frameworks of understanding 
available in our society for making sense out of events” (Goffman, 1974/1986: 10), 
which include seeing it as ‘what is really going on’, or “a joke, or a dream, or an 
accident, or a mistake, or a misunderstanding, or a deception, or a theatrical 
performance, and so forth.” (Goffman, 1974/1986: 10) In the final chapter of this 
book, he says that “(a)ctivities such as stage plays, planned con operations, 
experiments, and rehearsals, once begun, tend to foreclose other frame possibilities 
and require sustaining a definition of the situation in the face of diversions.” 
(Goffman, 1974/1986: 499)  
Furthermore, a strip of activity can be made sense of within a primary 
framework or it can be made sense of via keying or fabrication (Goffman, 1974/1986: 
Ch.3-4). Keyings are variations: “the key, I refer here to the set of conventions by 
which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, 
is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to 
be something quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying.” 
(Goffman, 1974/1986: 43-44) Activities that are being keyed receive a different 
meaning in that keying: examples of keyings include make-believe, contest, 
ceremonies, technical redoings including rehearsals, practicings, and mock exercises, 
and regroundings15 (Goffman, 1974/1986: Ch.3; Burns, 1992: 255-6). Thus, we have 
primary frameworks, as untransformed activity, and we have key(ing)s and 
fabrications as transformed activities (Smith, 2006: 58).16 “When the key in question 
is that of play, we tend to refer to the less transformed counterpart as “serious” 
activity; as will be seen, however, not all serious activity is unkeyed, and not all 
untransformed activity can be called serious.” (Goffman, 1974/1986: 46) Both here 
and in other places (Goffman, 1974/1986: 5, 564), Goffman seems keen to go beyond 
Schutz’s (1962: 208-228; 1967/32: 44, 69, 97) somewhat simplistic notion of the 
‘natural attitude’. Schutz had conceptualized the natural attitude as a unitary 
phenomenon, rooted in the “world of everyday life’ in which one has direct 
																																								 																					15	A	regrounding	is,	for	example,	when	for	the	camera,	a	prime	minister	serves	burgers	to	guests	on	a	
barbecue	16	Keying	has	not	been	taken	up	much	in	the	literature	and	transformed	activities	are	often	simply	
referred	to	as	‘reframed’.	
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experience of one’s fellow men, the world in which I assume that you are seeing the 
same table I am seeing.” (1967/32: 105) This shared world is the world of mundane 
reason, of everyday reality where different accounts need to be accounted for 
(Pollner, 2010). 
In contrast, Goffman was aware that when we make sense of something in 
everyday life within a primary framework, this may already be a complicated mixture 
of something ‘ordinary’ and, say an impersonation of a movie, i.e. a keying. In this 
sense, Goffman is moving away from phenomenology’s unproblematic access to our 
natural attitude and, arguably he is preparing the path for post-structuralist ideas: 
“Since the ‘actual’ is always already framed as the ‘real’ and in such a way that 
makes keying and fabrication probable, the kind of rereading suggested by Goffman’s 
writings is a matter of grasping simulations in terms of each other, as if a typology of 
simulations were possible.” (Clough, 1992: 108-9) By foreshadowing some of 
Baudrillard’s later and more far-reaching arguments, for Goffman (1974/1986: 564) 
“the everyday is not a special domain to be placed in contrast to the others, but merely 
another realm.” In the everyday, I can perceive behaviour as everyday, or as a prank, 
an impersonation, play-acting and so on. Here, Goffman moves away from a more 
simplistic, phenomenological analysis, which is still present in sentences like “In the 
world of real everyday activity, the individual can predict some natural events with a 
fair amount of certainty, but interpersonal outcomes are necessarily more 
problematic” (Goffman, 1974/1986: 133).  
By using Bateson, James and Schutz as points of departure, Goffman moves 
towards a highly complex, sophisticated and layered framing analysis, where even the 
primary framework might already be not serious. Instead of using the stage as a 
metaphor, and the language of the stage “a rhetoric”, “a manoeuvre” (Goffman, 
1959/71: 246), in Frame Analysis Goffman (1974/1986) clarifies that there are 
complicated variations: for example, just like an actor on stage will often speak aloud 
his intentions so that the audience can follow him, sometimes an agent in everyday 
life will do this “most evidently when an individual finds he must do something that 
might be misconstrued as blameworthy by strangers …” (ibid 564). Voicing your 
intention can sometimes be understood as the everyday actor keying the actor on stage 
- which again is a keying of the primary framework, the agent actually doing what the 
actor on stage is kind of doing.  
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A strategy report, or a strategy presentation is therefore a piece of 
communication that is designed in a particular way, but perhaps more importantly, 
sometimes significantly reframes certain events. Language, specialised vocabulary, 
format conventions, presentational conventions are employed as part of an effort to 
frame reality in a certain, different way: typically, a strategy report would suggest that 
the environment is analysable and knowable, partly by employing strategy tools, 
techniques and strategy language. Strategy is a distinct discourse (Knights & Morgan, 
1991), which means that reality is framed differently from a, say operational or 
financial, frame: “(t)he language of strategy provides a map for the future and the 
ability to construct problems that it then seeks to solve. Strategy, therefore, has the 
capacity to create problems: it does not simply respond to pre-existing problems.” 
(Clegg et al, 2004: 27) Strategy is a way to frame reality and by framing it a certain 
way, its protagonists can earn a place at the top table of corporate or organizational 
decision-making.  
It was part of strategy’s project to move to the top table, by arguing that by 
applying a strategy frame, reality can be analysed and understood better, with positive 
consequences for the company concerned. Framing reality with tools, techniques and 
2x2 matrices is based on a claim to superior mastery or understanding of the 
competitive environment: for example, McKinsey Germany’s CEO “credits 
McKinsey’s nine-box matrix with getting the Firm in the door at Siemens in 1974 …” 
(Kiechel, 2010: 259). Which types of framing are superior compared to alternatives is 
subject to discursive contestation and does not follow directly from the presumed 
quality of the tools and techniques employed: Porter (1996) outlined in great detail 
why and how strategy is different from ‘operational effectiveness’. Indeed, Porter 
argues that strategy is different from a whole range of management tools, such as 
‘benchmarking’, ‘total quality management’, ‘time-based competition’, ‘business 
process reengineering’, and change management. These management tools are 
concerned with increasing operational effectiveness, but they are not strategy.  
We could re-phrase Porter’s argument along the lines of him arguing that a 
strategy frame is different from an operational effectiveness frame, which means that 
(a) our criteria of evaluation are different, (b) our language is different, and (c) our 
time horizon is probably different. If we want to understand what happened in the 
strategy field, say in the 1990s, we could argue that after decades of loosening the 
notion of strategy, with more people occupying the strategy space, coming from 
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change management, or from HRM amongst others, one of the world’s leading 
thinkers on strategy decided to draw analytical boundaries, thus restricting the 
conceptual space of strategy, making it more exclusive (again). Speaking strategically 
and with authority was again to become a preserve for strategy consultants and 
strategy academics and not a free-for-all. Framing can thus be a status move, a move 
that carves out a space that is defined by closure, namely “exclusion [i.e.] power 
being directed downward.” (Murphy, 1986: 24). Certain groups should be prevented 
from using the strategy discourse, as unrestricted use clearly devalued strategy.  
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Our point of departure was our dissatisfaction with the existing reception and 
usage of Goffmanian insights in the Strategy field, in particular by the Strategy-as-
Practice community. We argued for a re-orientation of S-A-P to focus (again) on the 
actual praxis as practiced by practitioners; to take the question ‘how is it done in the 
doings?’ more seriously and more literally. We argued that foregrounding praxis, the 
‘as-it-happens’, needs to be central for any Strategy-as-Practice endeavor. For this 
purpose we have analyzed some core Goffman concerns, conceiving of “everyday life 
[as] made up of a series of sometimes subtle pressures to which we adjust with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm” (Hepworth, 1980: 81). For this purpose, we have 
provided empirical illustrations and possibilities for a future strategy research agenda.  
Over the last twenty years, it is fair to say that ‘strategy’ has become all-
pervasive and all public sector organisations, including universities, need to have a 
fully-developed strategy (Carter et al, 2008). Starting with the first Blair government 
in 1997, it was becoming obvious that in today’s world, also political parties entering 
government need to have a strategy (Rawnsley, 2001: 117, 159). What we can take 
from Goffman is the crucial role of performance based on idealizations. If applied to 
the current leaders or ‘high priests of society’, such as CEOs and prestigious strategy 
consultancies, we can argue that by performing convincingly, they can adjudicate on 
policy and strategic matters of highest importance (Mueller & Carter, 2005). Indeed, 
“(s)trategy is supposed to lead an organization through changes and shifts to secure its 
future growth and sustainable success, and it has become the master concept with 
which to address CEOs of contemporary organizations and their senior managers. Its 
talismanic importance can hardly be overstated.” (Carter et al, 2008: 83)  
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If the as-it-happens is central to understanding strategizing, then we need to 
focus on practices, or praxis, depending upon one’s definitions, rather than the 
interpretation of practices or what, supposedly, guides practices, namely normative 
orders, values, institutions or structural constrains. Rawls correctly says that 
“(p)ractices are things people do that other people can see, hear, smell, taste, and 
touch them doing.” (Rawls, 2003: 245) Against Rawls, the S-A-P perspective 
introduces a rather implausible distinction at this point, in that it wants to distinguish 
practices from praxis (Whittington, 2006). Drawing on Reckwitz (2002), Whittington 
(2006: 619) informs us that “ ‘practices’ will refer to shared routines of behavior, 
including traditions, norms and procedures for thinking, acting and using ‘things’ 
[…]. By contrast, the Greek word ‘praxis’ refers to actual activity, what people do in 
practice.” Five years later, Whittington explains that SAP has a “commitment to 
shared practices, rules and norms. Practice theory is about practices, just as it says on 
the tin. As widespread practices in contemporary advanced societies, accounting or 
strategizing always express larger, more enduring structures than just the activity 
observed in a particular moment.” (Whittington, 2011: 184) 
In way of critique, this definition displays an unfortunate reification of the 
term ‘practice(s)’, as it removes the condition of co-presence as a defining feature of a 
practice. Goffman certainly acknowledges the importance of norms (eg 1971/72: 124-
134) or social control (1971/72: 135-37), but they are norms-in-action or control-in-
action. One can observe the effect of these norms-in-action by observing and 
analyzing concrete performances. They are not entities that exist somewhere in a 
society’s secret vault. Structures are not practices in a Goffmanian sense; smelling, 
tasting and touching normally requires co-presence. By again foregrounding norms, 
this version of practice theory loses a substantial part of the impetus that motivated 
many anti-Parsonian social theorists, including Goffman, Garfinkel and Becker, who 
all wanted sociology to focus on happenings, or perhaps norms-in-action. If norms 
are practices then in what sense is SAP about ‘what actually happens’? Norms do not 
actually happen in any ordinary meaning of the latter word and they are clearly a 
fairly abstract, 2nd order sociological concept that has little use in everyday live. Few 
children, upon reaching the age of ten, will be given a long list of societal norms by 
their parents and asked to remember them. A similar point can be made for the notion 
of tradition: what does this notion actually explain given every day many traditions 
are disregarded and we would struggle to actually give a list of ‘relevant’ and widely 
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accepted traditions? Do we really gain much by calling norms practices and 
introducing a new term called praxis reserved specifically for situations involving co-
presence? If we followed a Goffmanian understanding, clearly, we would not do this. 
Rather than adopting the definition propagated by Whittington, we will now outline a 
Goffmanian understanding, which is not predicated on a somewhat problematic 
distinction between praxis and practices.  
Based on Goffman, we have argued that reality is not only socially constructed 
but is constructed in and through performances. Instead of invoking norms or values 
as separately existing entities, we have attempted to foreground Goffman’s notion of 
‘idealization’, which incorporates culturally valued principles and standards. 
Strategists, when delivering their performances, will perform idealized notions, which 
exclude things that need to be banished to the backstage: power, politics, money, 
greed, self-interest. These are the culturally unacceptable ‘forces’, characterized by 
Douglas (1966/2003)  as ‘impure’, as ‘dirt’, that must not be seen to drive 
organizational change, even if, in reality, they are absolutely the driving forces of 
organizational change. For any strategist to publicly mention these would mean not 
keeping “within the spirit or ethos of the situation” (Goffman, 1963: 11). The 
frontstage needs to remain ‘pure’, retain a proper “public decorum” (1963: 21) and 
‘dirt’ needs to be confined to the backstage, the “private places” (1963: 9) or the in-
between scenes, when strategists are permitted to “let expression fall from their faces” 
(1963: 25). When a group of strategy consultants presents to the Management Board, 
the idealization that they are a group of highly educated, very knowledgeable and 
highly competent professionals, always needs to be maintained, even if the strategy 
work was done by new recruits, barely out of university. For strategists, like for other 
professions, the audience needs to keep believing in the show: if the audience stops 
believing, the show cannot go on. 
If talking is an essential part of the performance, and if performing in front of 
others is a big part of strategizing, then talk in a public setting is a big part of 
strategizing. For strategists, such talk consists of convincing the clients that strategy is 
a legitimate discipline, that strategy is effective in improving the organizational 
performance, and that the tools and techniques offered by strategy as a discipline are 
actually effective. We have shown that such performances are not simply an add-on 
or the sales part, somewhat removed from the real work of strategy, but form a core 
part of the process of strategizing. Whittington (2011: 184) is not wrong to argue that 
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“strategizing always express larger, more enduring structures than just the activity 
observed in a particular moment.” However, one might be forgiven for having a sense 
that we are coming full circle. ‘Enduring structures’ have been analyzed by non-SAP 
approaches, such as Foucauldian approach to strategy (Knights & Morgan, 1991) or it 
has been used by Porter (1990) in the shape of the ‘National Diamond’, which 
contains fairly permanent societal and industry structures. It has been used by Porter 
(1980) in the notion of industry structure. Was the whole point of SAP not to move 
away from such abstractions and focus in on the mundane, the daily improvisations, 
the actual goings-on every day? Has S-A-P in response to its critics turned full circle 
in the attempt of wanting to please an ever larger audience?  
Strategy, and especially S-A-P, research inspired by Goffman is not suited to 
examine how “shifting institutional alignments condition, and are conditioned by, 
transformations of the settings in which social life is lived.” (Giddens, 1988: 279) 
Goffmanian inspired SAP wants to focus on the actuality of performances and there is 
much to be done. For example, there is little research into what happens on the 
backstage of strategists or strategy consultants. What are the conversations that take 
place in between the formal meetings, the formal presentations? Which type of footing 
is adopted by presenters or strategists in meeting? Can this footing stance at all be related 
to how successful organizational changes progresses subsequently? This is the promise of 
Goffman inspired strategy research. 
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